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What Evil Must Be in Order to Exist
If God created the world, then what we call “the evil in the world” is made pos-
sible, and practically unavoidable, by the conjunction of four facts: (1) the fact
that God created a finite world and determined the laws of nature to be precisely
thus as he in fact determined them to be (and not otherwise); (2) the fact that the
created world — in spite of finite resources — is full of beings which are conscious
and sensitive to pain, which want to live and to live well; (3) the fact that many
creatures, in order to live and live well, use and consume other creatures against
the will those creatures have to live and to live well, being more or less forced to
do so by the constitution of the world and by their ownwill to live and to live well;
(4) the fact that God gave to the created world a certain amount of independence,
not with respect to its sheer existence, but with respect to its development over
time: an independence that stems from absolute (ontic, non-epistemic) chance
and from free will.
However, is what we call “the evil in the world” really evil? Does the evil in
theworld really exist? Evil poses a problem for God’s perfection— and for his exis-
tence if God is, qua God, taken to be perfectly good, omnipotent, and omniscient
— only if evil does itself exist. But the existence of evil has again and again been
denied. It has been alleged that evil does not exist, more precisely: that it does not
really exist and is therefore properly speaking non-existent, although it might in a
sense be called “existent”; that evil is only the substanceless, in itself beingless,
shadow of being, which will “pop up” quite unavoidably if beings distinct from
God are present on all the countless levels of (greater or lesser) similitude to God
in themanner of existence. It is alleged that the plenitude of creation, on all levels
of being, is a consequence of God’s perfection; and so is, therefore, the shadow of
negativity that necessarily accompanies that plenitude. This shadow is the evil in
theworld, and althoughGoddoes not specificallywill it, he does accept it andper-
mit it. Indeed, hemust accept it and permit it as a sort of “collateral damage” of his
creating the world in God-imaging plenitude. Nevertheless, no opprobrium falls
on God — for evil, it is alleged, does not exist, because it is “without substance”.
Against this classical way of denying the existence of evil, it can, with justice,
be objected that it makes use of an overly demanding concept of existence: Ac-
cording to the classical denial, to exist (in the primary, proper sense) means to be
substantially real, that is: to be actual and integrated into a substance, or in other
words: to be something actual that is a substance or belongs to the “contents” of
a substance; in short, to exist means to be a res (cf. Summa Theologiae I, qu. 48,
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a. 2, ad 2; p. 239, column 1).¹ But this concept of existence cannot serve as an ade-
quate general concept of existence (which is, for now, conceived of as predicative
existence: existence which, in propositions, takes singular terms and not predi-
cates as arguments, in striking contrast to quantificative existence). For according
to that concept, evil is not the only item that is non-existent; according to it, many
other plausibly existing items are non-existent, too: in the first place, all privative
accidentia, whether individual or universal, and in the second place, all events,
states of affairs, and external relations. Moreover, it can be objected that the ar-
gumentative goal — the well-justified denial of the existence of evil — is not quite
attained. For if there were an actual personal substance which is essentially evil,
then one could not help admitting — in spite of using the demanding concept of
existence under consideration— that something evil exists. Note that it cannot be
with certainty excluded that there is an essentially evil personal substance; even
common human experience affords prima facie candidates which are far from be-
ing obviously inadequate.
Defining (predicative) existence as substantial reality is, structurally, the same
mistake as defining existence as necessary being, which definition would entail
that, except for God and perhaps some ideal entities (numbers and the like), noth-
ing at all exists (that is, exists properly speaking). It is, structurally, the same mis-
take as the mistake Plato made, and before him Parmenides, when he defined
being or existence as changeless actuality, with the consequence that the entire
empirically given world, and especially the material world as we know it from ex-
perience, does not exist, that is: does not properly speaking exist, and is therefore
properly speaking non-existent, although it may in a sense be called “existent”;
for the empirical world is certainly not changeless. The identical structural mis-
take in each of these three cases is the following: existence is conceived of in too
narrow a sense. The motivation for such narrowness is not far to seek: it allows
one to disregard, or at least to relegate to the darker corners of the background
of one’s attention, areas of actuality that one feels disturbed or oppressed by in
one’s intellectual dealings with the world — a manner of coping with actuality
that is quite typical for philosophers, contemporary philosophers not excluded
(in consideration of the fact that, like the majority of their predecessors, contem-
porary philosophers are fascinated bymonistic ontologies). If one has an intellec-
tual dislike of the contingent—well, if existence is taken to benecessary existence,
1 The second objection to the thesis that “malum invenitur in rebus” — in articulus 2 of quaes-
tio 48 of the Summa theologiae — starts with the assertion “ens et res convertuntur”. Thomas is
responding to this objection in qu. 48, a. 2, ad 2. Note that he does not reject “ens et res conver-
tuntur”.
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then nothing contingent exists, or in any case, nothing contingent exists properly
speaking (as one certainly prefers to put it), everything contingent does properly
speaking not exist (though in a sense it may be taken to exist). If one has an in-
tellectual dislike of change, and in particular of transience — well, if existence is
taken to be changeless actuality, then all changing and transient items do not ex-
ist, or in any case, they do not properly speaking exist, they are properly speaking
non-existent. And if evil is a thorn in one’s side (and for which person of goodwill
is it not a thorn in her side?)—well, if existence and goodness are interchangeable
(ens et bonum convertuntur), then nothing evil exists, or in any case, everything
evil does not properly speaking exist, does properly speaking not exist.
Two classical attempts to deny the existence of evil — or at least to belittle it
(as not being properly speaking existence), for absolute denial seems counterintu-
itive — by means of narrowing the concept of existence have now been presented:
(a) allegedly, existence conceptually requires substantial reality; (b) allegedly, ex-
istence conceptually requires goodness. Both these attempts originate in the phi-
losophy of antiquity, primarily in Platonism, and were used by Christian thinkers
— Augustine and Thomas Aquinas primarily — to relieve the considerable pres-
sure that evil exerts (in human thought) on God, on his perfect goodness, on his
omnipotence and omniscience, and, yes, on his existence itself. But there is yet
another classical attempt of malum-elimination by purely conceptual means, an
attempt, however, that has nothing to do with classical theistic, Christian philos-
ophy. This other attempt can be extracted from the powerful appendix to the first
part of Spinoza’s Ethica (ordine geometrico demonstrata). If to exist means to be
actual and wholly objective (which, for Spinoza, is to be actual in the objectivity
of the deus sive natura, we would say today: actual in the objectivity of natural
science), then nothing evil exists; for according to Spinoza, everything evil is, qua
evil, not purely objective. According to Spinoza, good and evil are merely amatter
of parochial egocentric interests, first, of the species — of Man — in competition
with the egocentric interests of other species, and second, of the human individ-
ual— thisman, thiswoman— in competitionwith the egocentric interests of other
human beings. Whether something is evil or not, is, according to Spinoza, always
and necessarily relative to certain egocentric interests. The predication of “evil”
varieswith those egocentric interests: the same event— for example, the killing of
a human being — which is evil relative to the egocentric interests of X, for exam-
ple, the victim, is not at all evil relative to the egocentric interests of Y, for example,
the killer. But now, what iswholly objective is ipso facto not relative to any egocen-
tric interests whatsoever, and therefore: everything evil is, qua evil, not wholly
objective (since what is evil is, qua evil, relative to certain egocentric interests).
And therefore — now the specifically Spinozistic manner of malum-elimination
by means of narrowing the concept of existence is put into operation — every-
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thing evil does not exist, or in any case, it does not properly speaking exist, that
is, it does properly speaking not exist. Consider an event which, in common par-
lance, is said to be an “evil act”. If one insists that the act is evil, then it is, qua
evil, not wholly objective, and hence it does not exist (not properly speaking); and
if one insists that the act exists (properly speaking), then it is, qua existent, wholly
objective, hence not evil. In any case, existence and evil are not to be had together
in one and the same object.² Doubtless, this is counterintuitive; yet it is the in-
escapable result of conceptual decisions which have seemed plausible not only to
Spinoza. And, note, the two Spinozistic suppositions that value-concepts are rela-
tive to egocentric interests (and therefore do not have a wholly objective content)
and that existence is actuality in pure objectivity together entail the following:
Everything good does not exist. For if value-concepts are relative to egocentric in-
terests and if existence is actuality in pure objectivity, then also everything good
is, qua good, not wholly objective, and hence (properly speaking) non-existent.
In the atmosphere of true existence, of actuality in pure objectivity, sub specie
aeternitatis, both good and evildisappear (in a sense). This is Spinoza’s vision and
the basis of his peculiar theodicy, in which a very icy wind is blowing: the wind
of superhuman indifference, called “perfection” by Spinoza:
For many are wont to argue as follows: If everything follows from the necessity of the most
perfect nature of God, how is it, then, that there are so many imperfections in Nature, the
decay of things till they stink, the nauseating deformity of things, confusion, evil, sin, and so
forth? But [. . . ] they are easy to refute. For the perfection of things is only to be appraised on
the basis of their nature and power; and things are not more perfect or less perfect because
they delight or offend the senses of human beings, or are amenable to human nature, or
repugnant to it. To those, however, who query why God has not created all human beings
in such a manner as to be ruled solely by the guidance of reason, I answer nothing else
but this: Because he did not lack matter for creating everything, from the highest degree of
perfection, doubtless, down to the lowest. Or speaking more properly: Because the laws of
his nature were so vast that they sufficed to bring forth everything that can be conceived by
an infinite intellect³ (the translation into English: U.M.).
2 According to thismanner of thinking, what is not wholly objective, and therefore non-existent,
may (and will as a rule) have an actual kernel which is wholly objective and therefore existent.
What in an evil act canbedescribedbyusingmerely the vocabulary of physics constitutes suchan
actual and wholly objective kernel; Spinoza would not have doubted the existence of the purely
physical goings-on that enter into the constitution of amurder. Spinozistically, one can, therefore,
say that the evil act, the murder, does exist if taken in abstraction from its evilness, but does not
exist if taken in non-abstraction from its evilness, or in other words: the murder, qua evil, does
not exist; the murder, qua physical event, exists.
3 “Solent enim multi sic argumentari. Si omnia ex necessitate perfectissimae Dei naturae sunt
consecuta, unde ergo tot imperfectiones in natura ortae? Videlicet, rerum corruptio ad faetorem
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Spinoza’s concept of perfection (that is, what he calls “perfection”) is a perfectly
naturalistic and therefore perfectly objective concept, but it is also without axio-
logical content that could be even remotely comprehensible to, and acceptable to,
normal human beings. In this, Spinoza is very different from the Christian prac-
titioners of the narrowing of the concept of existence with God-justifying intent;
note also that theymade only evil disappear (in a sense), not also good alongwith
evil. Nevertheless, many people have seen a deep, a truly liberating wisdom pre-
cisely in Spinoza’s wholly objective — or rather: value-rejecting — conception of
existence.⁴
It was not a new conception even in Spinoza’s time. Shakespeare makes
Hamlet say en passant and playfully: “[T]here is nothing either good or bad, but
thinking makes it so” (Hamlet, act 2, scene 2; p. 932, column 1); and Shakespeare,
too, already had this from somewhere. Yet it is a conception that impresses us
as decidedly modern. Wittgenstein, for example, shares it with Shakespeare (or
Hamlet) and Spinoza: “In theworld, everything is as it is, and everything happens
as it happens; there is in it no value”⁵ (the translation into English: U.M.). When
Wittgenstein is speaking of “value” here, negative value is certainly intended
along with positive value. Moreover, the tautological formulations “is as it is” and
“happens as it happens” are figures of speech: in front of the second “is” and
the second “happens”, the expression “wholly objectively” is implicit. Explicitly
formulated, Wittgenstein’s apothegm must, therefore, be phrased as follows: “In
the world, everything is as it wholly objectively is, and everything happens as it
wholly objectively happens; there is in it no positive or negative value.” If one is
able to accept this, make it one’s own, live it, then one is with oneself, with the
world, and with God — if one still believes in him (but Spinoza, in his own way,
certainly did so) — at peace.
usque, rerum deformitas, quae nauseammoveat, confusio, malum, peccatum &c. Sed [. . . ] facile
confutantur. Nam rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura, & potentia est aestimanda, nec ideo
res magis, aut minus perfectae sunt, propterea quod hominum sensum delectant, vel offendunt,
quod humanae naturae conducunt, vel quod eidem repugnant. Iis autem, qui quaerunt, cur Deus
omnes homines non ita creavit, ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur? nihil aliud respondeo,
quam quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia, ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum,
creanda; vel magis proprie loquendo, quia ipsius naturae leges adeo amplae fuerunt, ut sufficer-
ent ad omnia, quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt, producenda” (Ethica, First Part,
Appendix; p. 106 and 108).
4 Wholly objective does not in itself and uncontroversially entail value-rejecting; but in the eyes
of many — and certainly in Spinoza’s eyes — it does.
5 “In derWelt ist alles, wie es ist, und geschieht alles, wie es geschieht; es gibt in ihr keinenWert”
(Tractatus, 6.41; p. 82).
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The attempts to deny the existence of evil that have been considered so far in
this essaywere based on a predicative, not a quantificative conception of : each at-
tempt operated with its specific, rather exclusive concept of predicative existence.
Predicative existence is characterized by the fact that “exists” connects with a sin-
gular term to form a proposition; for example, in the proposition “Pegasus exists”,
“exists” connects with the singular term “Pegasus”. If the predicative conception
of existence is embraced, then denying the existence of evil is bound to be logi-
cally equivalent with asserting the one or the other of the following two proposi-
tions: “Everything evil does not exist”, or in other words, “Nothing evil exists”.
But, note, neither of these two (logically equivalent) propositions entails “Noth-
ing is evil”. That nothing evil exists — that everything evil does not exist — does
not logically exclude that something is evil: If no F is G, if every F is not G (or: if
every F is non-G), it simply does not follow that nothing is F. Philosophers who
believe that everything evil does not exist may, from the logical point of view, also
believe that something is evil, indeed, that many things are evil; it is only that all
this evil they acknowledgemust nevertheless have no (proper) existence for them
— say, because it is, qua evil, not substantially real, or not wholly objective, or,
simply, not good.
Now, a farmore radical attempt to deny the existence of evil than the attempts
considered so far can be launched if one proceeds on the basis of a quantificative,
not a predicative conception of existence. The relevant concept of existence canbe
simply expressed by the word “something” — i.e., by a quantifier. Quantificative
existence is characterized by the fact that “something” connects with a complete
predicate to form a proposition; for example, in the proposition “Something is a
winged horse”, “something” connects with the complete predicate “is a winged
horse”. If the quantificative conception of existence is embraced, then the denial
of the existence of evil is bound to amount to asserting the following proposition:
“Nothing is evil”.
In contrast to the predicative conception, the quantificative conception of
existence does not invite the interpretation and re-interpretation of existence-
expressions. For when one is employing the quantificative concept of existence,
one is simply formulating a proposition of cardinality: “Something is a winged
horse” means nothing else than that the number of winged horses is either 1 or
a larger number. The negation of “Something is a winged horse” is “Nothing is
a winged horse”, and this, too, is simply a proposition of cardinality: it means
nothing else than that the number of winged horses is 0. Therefore, if one wishes
to justify that nothing is evil— in other words, if one wishes to deny the existence
of evil while embracing the quantificative conception of existence — then this
means that one must justify that the number of (what is) evil is 0. And in the
proposition “The number of evil is 0” there is only one element which can be
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manipulated, only one switch, so to speak, that can be turned this way or that
way, and this switch is the interpretation of the word “evil” itself.
But has it ever been really attempted, in the course of the history of philos-
ophy, to justify not only the assertion that nothing evil exists, but also the logi-
cally stronger assertion that nothing is evil? The first thing to be said in response
to this question is that, right up to the present, many philosophers — including
the founder of modern logic, Gottlob Frege — have confessed themselves entirely
unable to distinguish the logical content of the one assertion from that of the other
(whereas they would all be perfectly able, I presume, to distinguish, with respect
to logical content, the assertion that nothing evil is good, or that nothing evil is sub-
stantially real, or that nothing evil is wholly objective, from the logically stronger
assertion that nothing is evil). To those philosophers, the two sentences “Nothing
evil exists” and “Nothing is evil” (or their counterparts in other languages) have
seemed to have the very same logical content, have seemed to express that con-
tent merely in different ways. And those philosophers are not entirely wrong. The
reason why they are not entirely wrong is this: If one takes “to exist” in its widest
possible sense under the predicative conception, according to which sense “to ex-
ist” means as much as “to be identical with something”, then, indeed, “Nothing
evil exists” and “Nothing is evil” have the same logical content, because “Noth-
ing evil is identical with something” and “Nothing is evil” do have the same log-
ical content.⁶ Unfortunately, the widest possible sense of “to exist” was not the
intended sense of “to exist” when philosophers asserted that nothing evil exists;
as we have seen, they intended senses of “to exist” that were much narrower (or
stronger), logically speaking, than the sense of “to be identical with something”.
Whether philosophers believe or don’t believe that they are able to distinguish
logically between “Nothing evil exists” and “Nothing is evil”, it will usually be
apparent whether they are inclined, or not inclined, to assert that nothing is evil.
Leibniz, doubtless, was inclined to assert that nothing is evil, considering his no-
torious thesis that the actual world, this world (“the world”, as one also says) is
the best of all possible worlds; for Leibniz, the best of all possible worlds can only
be one in which, in a certain (Leibnizian) sense, nothing is evil. In what sense?
Consider here that Leibniz, if Voltaire’s Candide had come into his hands, would
not have needed to read the book in order to be aware that this, allegedly, best
of all possible worlds is full of calamities; this fact was known to Leibniz just as
6 Consider that “Something evil is identical with something” and “Something is evil” are log-
ically equivalent — and so are, therefore, the negations of these propositions, “Nothing evil is
identical with something” and “Nothing is evil”.
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much as it was known to Voltaire. However, for Leibniz, not one of the countless
calamities of this world is evil (or an evil).Why is this so?
The sense in which nothing is evil in this best of all possible worlds must be
taken to be determined by Leibniz’s choice of the sense of theword “evil” (alterna-
tive senses of the quantifier “nothing” are not on offer for his choosing). According
to Leibniz, only that is evil that stays evil even if the totality of the world is taken
into account. In other words, Leibniz defined “evil” as “evil in relation to the whole
(world)”. Now, Leibniz was convinced (on the basis of a priori proof, he thought)
that the actual world, this world, is the best of all possible worlds; among other
things, this meant for him that the actual world is a world in which nothing is evil
in relation to the whole. Hence, according to Leibniz’s holistic conception of evil,
the actual world is a world in which nothing is evil. Nothing, therefore, is evil —
that is, simpliciter evil, evil in the (for Leibniz) primary sense; for of course many
things are, though not in relation to the whole, yet in relation to a part of the whole
(world) evil — evil not in global, but in particular respect. Leibniz was far from
denying this.
The strategy Leibniz employed is, in principle, well-known to us. If a calamity
happens to us, then the following comforting thoughtmay not be far fromus:Who
knows what it is good for? However, this thought hardly comes to us if we are con-
scious of failings on our side which contributed to bringing about the calamity,
or if the calamity simply surpasses a certain size. In any case, that thought pro-
poses to us to consider the larger context, the kind of context which, if taken into
account, often makes the evaluation of something turn out to be rather different
from what it was when the matter was more or less myopically considered — the
larger context which we automatically, and quite reasonably, take to be the more
appropriate context for evaluation. And if we insightfully consider the largest con-
text (no doubt, the proper context for ultimate evaluation), that is, the totality of
everything existing, the actual world as a whole — if we manage to do this, then,
Leibniz firmly believed, everything which seemed evil at first turns out to be good
in the end.
But we are not really able to effect in us the insightful consideration of the
largest context. Already for that reason alone we have no idea — Leibniz, too, had
no idea—what goodwith respect to the grand totality could be in seeminglymean-
ingless raging pain, in the violent death of millions, in the utter destruction of
cities and regions. Nevertheless, what is radically evil in relation to a (compara-
tively) small partmight be good, or at least not evil, in relation to the grand totality.
How this might be is certainly incomprehensible for our limited intellects, but it
would not be for the intellect of God. Thus, one is drawing some comfort — only
some — from human ignorance, especially in this case, where God, his very exis-
tence, is taken to be in jeopardy as an object of belief for the believer.
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The idea to nullify (in cognition) what is prima facie evil by considering it in
the context of the totality of the actual world, the idea to (cognitively) “bonify” it
in the grand totality, cannot be carried out by any human being; it can, at best,
only be firmly believed that this idea is realizable in principle (by a being with su-
perhuman cognitive abilities) — for which realizability the idea must, of course,
reflect the truth. Leibniz was not the first to have that idea and not the first to
believe that it reflects the truth and is in principle realizable; the idea is recogniz-
ably employed, for God-exculpating purposes, already in the thought of Thomas
Aquinas (and likely even earlier).
It must be emphasized that Thomas, just like Leibniz, was far from denying
that some things in the world are evil (malum) in relation to a part of the world.
Thomas even affirms that something evil exists, provided “exists” (Thomas says
“est ens” or “dicitur ens”) is understood in such a way as to be synonymous with
the non-copulative “is [est]”⁷ taken in a very wide signification: “[H]ocmodo etiam
malum dicitur ens” (S. Th. I, qu. 48, a. 2, ad 2; p. 239, column 1). If, however,
“exists” is taken in the much narrower sense according to which “ens [. . . ] con-
vertitur cum re” (ibid.), that is, in the sense according to which “exists” means
as much as “is substantially real” (this latter sense is certainly the primary one
for Thomas), then Thomas affirms: “[H]oc modo, nulla privatio est ens: unde nec
malum” (ibid.).
And Thomas even believes, like Leibniz, that the actual world — “the world”,
in short — is a world in which nothing is malum in relation to the totality (of the
world), which belief amounts for him—as for Leibniz— to the belief that nothing is
(simpliciter, in the primary sense) evil. Thomas, therefore, does not only deny the
existence of evil by means of interpreting existence predicatively in some sense
that makes predicative denial — the assertion that every evil is non-existent — ra-
tionally possible, even necessary (which is the form of evil-denial that emerges,
regarding Thomas, at the end of the previous paragraph). He also denies the ex-
istence of evil by means of interpreting existence not predicatively but quantifica-
tively and proceeding, like Leibniz, on the basis of a concept of evil (simpliciter, in
the primary sense) thatmakes quantificative denial— the assertion that nothing is
evil—at least rationally possible; it is, in fact, the same concept of evil that Leibniz
uses, the holistic one, mentioned (again) just at the beginning of this paragraph:
God, and Nature, and any agent, does what is better in relation to the whole, but not what
is better in relation to an arbitrary part, unless it is considered in its function for the whole
7 The non-copulative “is” is the “is” which already by itself constitutes an entire predicate, as in
“God is [Deus est]”.
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[. . . ]. This whole, however, which is the universe of creatures, is better and more perfect
if it contains some things which can fall short of the good, and which occasionally do so,
withoutGodpreventing it. [. . . ] [M]uch that is goodwouldbe eliminated if Goddidnot permit
anything evil [evil in parte!] to be [to be in a very wide sense!]. For firewould not be generated
if air were not destroyed; norwould the life of the lion be conserved if the asswere not killed;
norwould vindicating justice and sufferingpatience bepraised if therewereno iniquity⁸ (the
translation into English: U.M.).
Taken as a whole, therefore, the world is good for Thomas, and indubitably so, in
consideration of the authorities Thomas acknowledged; indeed, it is very good for
him, as we can say in view of Genesis 1, 31. The many evils in it (Thomas did not
close his eyes to them) are evil only in parte (compare footnote 8) — in relation to
a part. In relation to the whole— in toto (compare footnote 8) — they are not evil;
for they, by their evilness in parte, serve the greater goodness in toto. If they were
lacking, the degree of goodness of the world would be lower, though the degree
of goodness of parts of the world would be higher.
The world, according to this way of thinking, is very good, and themany evils
in it are evil only in relation to this or that part of it. Is there anything that is evil in
relation to the whole (world)? The world, certainly, (being good) is not evil in rela-
tion to the whole (i.e., to itself), and — it is alleged — nothing else in the world is
evil in relation to the whole (i.e., the world). This exhausts the universe of quan-
tification of the actual world. Identifying the universe of quantification with the
universe of quantification of the actual world, it is therefore true (i.e., true in the
actual world): nothing (in the world) is evil in relation to the whole, that is, noth-
ing is (simpliciter, in the primary sense) evil. This is asserted by Thomas asmuch as
it is asserted by Leibniz. But these two great metaphysical optimists had no proof
whatsoever for their thesis (nomatter what Leibniz thought); it is for them a thesis
of fundamental belief, and as such it seems to have the inestimable advantage of
being irrefutable. Denied, however, it has been: other people, other experiences,
othermetaphysical attitudes.
8 “Deus et natura, et quodcumque agens, facit quod melius est in toto; sed non quod melius
est in unaquaque parte, nisi per ordinem ad totum [. . . ]. Ipsum autem totum quod est universi-
tas creaturarum, melius et perfectius est, si in eo sint quaedam quae a bono deficere possunt,
quae interdum deficiunt, Deo hoc non impediente. [. . . ] [M]ulta bona tollerentur, si Deus nullum
malum permitteret esse. Non enim generaretur ignis, nisi corrumperetur aer; neque conservare-
tur vita leonis, nisi occideretur asinus; neque etiam laudaretur iustitia vindicans, et patientia
sufferens, si non esset iniquitas” (S. Th. I, qu. 48, a. 2, ad 3; p. 239, column 1).
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In the first place, one must point here to the movement of Gnosticism,⁹which
flowered in later antiquity. For the Gnostics, the world — the whole, the totality —
was not at all good; for them, it was thoroughly evil; almost everything in it was
unconditionally evil. For this reason,God could not be the creator of the world for
the Gnostics. And the god told about in the Old Testament could not be God; for
they did regard the god of the Old Testament as the creator of the world. For the
Gnostics, Yahwe is an inferior impostor, certainly not the father of Jesus Christ.
For them, the father of Jesus Christ is the unknowable, true god, who not only
transcends the world but is also, as it were, at an infinite distance from it — aside
from the fact that he sent mankind a redeemer.
Secondly, one must point to the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, whose
deep metaphysical pessimism is a rather rare occurrence in western philosophy.
According to Schopenhauer, too, the world is thoroughly evil; almost everything
in it is unconditionally evil. Theworld is themanifestation of awill-to-exist who is
divided against itself. This will — at first unconsciously, then with sensation and
perception, then guided by reason — surges into being in uncountable particu-
larizations that are pitted against each other in a destructive and utterly painful
struggle for existence. On a very high level of its evolution, namely, on the level
of humanness, the will-to-exist finally realizes its own nature, after infinite pain,
and is enabled by this realization to negate itself at least in part (in the person of
a human being), thus reaching a state of liberation from itself which is not dis-
similar to the state that the Buddhists call “nirvana”. For Schopenhauer, God is
no longer a factor to be reckoned with.
Is this world a hell? Who has to live in this world under hell-like conditions
will tend to agree with the Gnostics and with Schopenhauer: this world is indeed
a hell. Who is more fortunate will tend to disagree, as is only to be expected in
view of the fact that the ability of true and deep empathy with those who suf-
fer is fairly underdeveloped among human beings. But the question whether this
world is hell-like or not need not be answered; at least it is not a question of pri-
mary interest. The question whether the world is (on the whole) evil is of primary
interest. If the world is (on the whole) evil, a thing that had rather not been, as the
Gnostics and Schopenhauer believed, then — whether this world is a hell or not
(in places it is not, otherwise there would be no philosophizing here and now) —
. . . then the strategy of Thomas and Leibniz fails, the strategy of making the many
local evils of the world vanish, as it were, in the goodness or even perfection of
9 It must be noted that aside from itsmore or less pronouncedmetaphysical dualism, gnosticism
has no unitary form. By “Gnosticism”, I here mean Christian gnosticism, the paradigmatic form
of which is Marcionism.
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the world as a whole: as being necessary for the global goodness. If the world it-
self is evil, then it cannot be denied that something is simpliciter, in the primary
sense evil; this is so because the world, if it is evil, is trivially evil in relation to the
whole, the totality of the world. Then it cannot be denied, moreover, that some-
thing evil exists, no matter how demanding is the concept of existence one uses;
for the world certainly exists in a stronger sense than all of its (proper) parts, even
all of its substantially real parts.¹⁰ Then also the double strategy of Spinoza fails,
which consisted, on the one hand, in defining existence as a concept that is inde-
pendent from the perspective of the egocentric interests of any particular being:
as actuality in pure objectivity; and on the other hand, in binding good and evil
with conceptual necessity to precisely some such perspective or other, thus cut-
ting good and evil off from pure objectivity, and hence from existence. Spinoza’s
strategy fails; for the world is certainly actual in pure objectivity, actual indepen-
dently from any egocentric interests, and therefore exists in Spinoza’s sense. And
if it is evil—under this hypothesismy considerations have stood just now, and still
stand— then this, contrary to Spinoza,must be sowholly objectively, that is, be so,
but not in the perspective of the egocentric interests of a particular being; for the
perspective of the egocentric interests of a particular being does not refer to the
world as a whole; it invariably refers only to a local, very small part of the world.
(This is also the case for human beings; as “global players” they persistently con-
fuse the worldwith the earth, and as “non-global players” they often confuse it —
in practice if not in theory — with their wider environment, which is delimited by
their radius of action.)
But is it true that the world is (on the whole) evil? Thomas, Leibniz, and
Spinoza, whatever their philosophical differences, agree in holding that it is not
evil. But there are certain indications that it is evil after all. The world appears to
be a closed system. Therefore, according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics,
the temporal progress of the world is directed at an equal distribution in space
of all the energy in it (the quantity of which is constant, according to the Law
of the Conservation of Energy), at a levelling of all energy-differences. Globally,
the degree of energy-levelling in the world is always increasing. In other words,
the world is fixedly directed towards destruction and decay; the cosmic desert
is constantly growing. Of course, the world is not everywhere and always going
in this direction; it is only doing so on the whole, or as a whole. Consider this
dramatic reversal: Whereas Thomas and Leibniz believed that locally there is
malum in the world, but that the world as a whole is a bonum, even perfectum
10 One might still hold that existence requires goodness, and then conclude that the world does
not exist from the (presumed) fact that the world is evil. But how plausible is that?
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(in relation to which every local evil in the world is a global good), natural sci-
ence strongly suggests that locally there is bonum in the world, something that,
for the moment, is not heading towards its ruin, but that the world as a whole
is a malum: something that heads towards its complete ruin. The rare islands
in space-time that oppose the cosmic decay, the living beings, are spatially and
temporally extremely local, extremely confined: they are transitory, ephemeral
phenomena. Global decay will sooner or later — usually very quickly — break
their resistance. The most horrible thing is this: The global process of decay itself
brings forth these phenomena, the living beings, apparently automatically (given
that the conditions in this or that place, at this or that time, have the right quality
and constellation) – only to destroy them later on. Apparently automatically, the
global process of decay itself provides living beings with many means that might
conceivably serve the purpose of resisting destruction — only to smash them in
the end, as children will smash the castles in the sand which they build precisely
for the purpose of smashing them. In particular, the global process of decay pro-
vides action-relevant consciousness to many living beings — which, if the animal
is in an optimal state, is certainly its strongest weapon in the struggle for survival,
but which, if the animal is not in an optimal state, turns out to be the locus of its
pain and suffering. Another evil is this: higher living beings can maintain their
life-processes only by destroying other living beings; thus, life itself serves anni-
hilation: a living being destroysmany others before it is itself destroyed. A further
evil is this: consciousness does not only protect a living being; on the highest
evolutionary level it makes the demands of the animal — and thus the chances
for (at least) unhappiness — rise immoderately; on that level, consciousness finds
reasons and occasions for annihilation — be it of one’s own life or the life of
others — everywhere, even in the biologically irrelevant, and, to boot, produces
for annihilation, with never failing inventiveness, the most efficient means. All of
this is to be observed, even in a form that endangers all terrestrial life, in human
beings. Thus, consciousness, too, serves annihilation.
Theworld is directed towards decay and destruction (and is not, as certain ap-
pearances suggest, in a perpetual cycle of coming into being and passing away —
what would be some comfort indeed). The world is heading towards the state of a
universal desert in which everywhere in the universe the same temperature reigns
forever—not far from absolute zero. Long before this, there will have been an end
to mankind and to all life on earth. Not unlikely, mankind itself will have brought
about its own demise; if not, something elsewill have taken care of that. The great
end will come; it is as certain as the “little end” — our own death — is certain to
come. Everything is under the rule of death. For this reason, one can only succeed
by a special form of obtuseness in living up towhat Spinoza recommended per im-
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plicationem: to be a free human being and, as such, to think of nothing less than
of (one’s own) death (Ethica, Fourth Part, Prop. 67; p. 580).
Why is the world like this? To this question, there is no scientific answer. If
there is an answer, itmust be ametaphysical one. Indeed, as ametaphysician, one
cannot reject that question, and especially one cannot do this if, besides being a
metaphysician, one professes: “I believe in God, the father almighty, creator of
heaven and earth” — if, in other words, one has already assumed a certain basic
metaphysical attitude, an attitude which obviously is especially hard to reconcile
with the fact that the world is heading towards universal death.
One does not come near an answer to the question of why the world is head-
ing towards universal death by simply advancing the traditional doctrine of the
Fall (of Man); for the world had begun to run its course of death long before Man
appeared on the stage of evolution and was able to sin. All considerations on evil
that refer to the free will of (some) creatures are irrelevant here.¹¹ Although the
free will of human beings, and perhaps also of other rational creatures, can very
well accelerate the death-run of the world (in any case, here on earth, as the past
and the present amply show), the free will of rational creatures cannot stop it or
reverse it — not even if each rational creaturewere, out of freewill, perfectly good.
To speak with the Bible: The form of this world passes away (1 Corinthians 7, 31),
and we have here no continuing city (Hebrews 13, 14). As Rilke says, “We arrange
it. It falls apart. We arrange it again, and fall apart ourselves” (from the Eighth
Duinesian Elegy; translation into English: U.M.).¹²
Man is not responsible for the fact of global decay. The global decay cannot be
a deserved punishment for superhuman (immaterial) rational creatures; it is also
not a deserved punishment for us human beings. On the contrary, from the begin-
ning human beings have been victims of the global decay. Their status as victims
is in considerable part also to be diagnosed with regard to the peculiar human
proneness to do evil (which proneness is traditionally called “original sin”); for
universal transitoriness, as an inexorable constant of nature, brings forth selfish-
ness, immoderate craving, ruthlessness, envy, hardheartedness, avarice; it does
so phylogenetically, by dint of biological evolution, hence hereditarily. The vices
just named are at the root of the greater part of human evil doings, andwith worst
11 In general, creaturely free will is accorded a far too great weight in the debate on theodicy.
The so-called free will defense (advanced by Alvin Plantinga andmany others in the course of the
history of philosophy) is really no defense at all.
12 “Wir ordnens. Es zerfällt. Wir ordnens wieder und zerfallen selbst”; Rilke, Die Gedichte, p.
660.
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effect if they are combined with a sense of superiority — arrogance — and have
forced reason and free will into their service.¹³
No, if God created the world, then he himself, not reacting to anything, has
from the start doomed it to destruction — certainly in such a way that it is going
down with a great amount of sparkling radiance, like fireworks at night, but also
in such a way that it is going down with immense creaturely pain, like a sink-
ing ship. But why is this so if God is perfectly good, almighty, and all-knowing?
Or has something or someone other than God produced the world, something or
someone whose malum of cosmic dimensions has been transferred, in the act of
creation, onto the so-called “cosmos” and made manifest in it? This is the posi-
tion of the Gnosis, and Schopenhauer’s, but completely unacceptable for every
orthodox Jew, Christian, or Muslim. Or is the world — after its accidental or neces-
sary coming into being— doomed to darkness by inner, absolute necessity, hence
inexorably moved to its death entirely without God and also entirely without “the
prince of this world”? Truly, this is the bleakest position, since it excludes all con-
solation, confronting us with the existence of evil not only undeniably but also
without any contingent explanation and, consequently, without any hope of sal-
vation. If theworld is eo ipso—with intrinsic necessity— evil, if there is a First Evil
in this sense, then the question of what evil must be in order to exist inexplicably
and irredeemably has found its answer.
For everyone, however, who continues to believe in God’s existence and who
continues to believe that God created the world and is a loving father, there re-
mains, on the one hand, the agonizing riddle that such a god (the Father Almighty)
created this world, and, on the other hand, the more or less desperate hope of a
change of this world for the better and best, a change brought about precisely by
God (the Father Almighty). For thosewhobelieve in Christ, there is,moreover, con-
solation in the fact that God already acted similarly before, within the history of
this world, within the human sphere. For them, there is a unique historical pro-
totype of the fulfilment of a hope beyond hope and of continuing metaphysical
incomprehension. There is, on the one hand, the riddle that this god (the Father
Almighty) had such a man, Jesus, die on the cross (certainly not for our sins), and
there is, on the other hand, themiracle not one of Jesus’s companionswould have
dared to hope for: that just this god resurrected just this man from the dead.
13 Free will which is forced into the service of evil stays free; it is only that its range of choices is
reduced.
128 | Uwe Meixner
Bibliography
Rilke, R. M. (1990), Die Gedichte [The Poems], Frankfurt a. M.: Inselverlag.
Shakespeare, W. (1972), “Hamlet, Prince of Denmark”, in The Complete Signet Classic Shake-
speare, edited by S. Barnet, New York: Harcourt-Brace-Jovanovich, 917–961.
Spinoza, B. (1997), Die Ethik [Ethica], Latin and German, Stuttgart: Reclam.
Thomas Aquinas (1988), Summa Theologiae, Milan: Editiones Paulinae.
Wittgenstein, L. (1984), “Tractatus logico-philosophicus”, inWerkausgabe, Vol. 1, Frankfurt a.
M.: Suhrkamp, 7–85.
